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Can Copyright Become User-Friendly?
Essay Review of Jessica Litman,  DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (Prometheus Books
2001)
Jane C. Ginsburg1
A few initial disclaimers are in order: Professor Litman is my friend and
co-author (Trademarks, 3d ed. Foundation Press 2001, with Mary L. Kevlin,
Esq.).  We have discussed - and often warmly disagreed about - copyright law
for over a dozen years.  I like to believe that we are reputable representatives
of currently opposing tendencies (not to say, even hostile camps) in copyright
scholarship.  From a welter of commentary, Professor Litman’s work stands out
as well-researched, doctrinally solid, and always, piercingly well-written.  Much
of it is also very persuasive.  I might like to say that much of it is also wrong,
but my reservations regarding some of her contentions or conclusions are more
nuanced than that.  This review of her recent book, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, will
attempt to explain why anyone interested in copyright, and particularly anyone
who wishes to defend and strengthen it, should pay careful attention to Prof.
Litman’s arguments.
Copyright lawyers, however, are not Professor Litman’s target
audience, nor are lawyers of any kind.  She has written this book for the general
public, though lawyers, and especially copyright lawyers, would do well to read
it.  Professor Litman’s message is straightforward: Copyright law is too
complicated and counterintuitive.  It has been written by and for copyright
lawyers who represent many, but not all, of the players.  Those left out include
developers of new ways of communicating copyrighted works, and, most
importantly, end users.  But nowadays, copyright directly affects end users in
ways more pervasive than could have been expected in the analog world.  If
copyright law doesn’t make sense to those who are supposed to adhere to it,
copyright will cease to be a meaningful constraint on users’ activities.
In this review, I will first briefly address Professor Litman’s evocation
of the copyright law-making process.  Her discussion of legislative history
presents a valuable and compelling account, especially for those unfamiliar with
copyright law.  Nonetheless, it is not a principal focus of this review.  For those
who read the Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts (many of whom may
well be copyright lawyers), the most provocative portions of the book, to which
2See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 857 (1987); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
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I will devote most attention, are likely to be the chapters in which Professor
Litman (a) reviews and challenges various metaphors for copyright policy
(Chapter 5, “Choosing Metaphors”); (b) in which she recounts the rocky
relationship between copyright owners and developers of new technological
means of disseminating works (Chapter 10, “The Copyright Wars”); and (c) in
which she offers her own prescription for a simple, fair and workable copyright
law (Chapter 12, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age”).  DIGIT L
COPYRIGHT does not dispel our disagreements about copyright’s goals and
proper scope; if anything, because Professor Litman is such an effective
advocate, she has forced me to think harder about why, in many (though far
from all) respects, I remain unconvinced.  The following review therefore
endeavors not only to present Professor Litman’s arguments, but to offer some
reasons for continued resistence to those claims.      
What’s Wrong with the Way Our Copyright Laws are Made?
Professor Litman devotes much of the book to demonstrating how our
copyright laws came to be the unwieldy overprotective mess she describes.
These chapters have considerable narrative drive, tinged, in the case of the most
recent legislation, with intimations of a vast copyright-owner conspiracy to
undermine fair use.  But Professor Litman is even-handed in her criticism; the
tale she tells also recounts the failure of groups that should have guarded the
public interest to stick by that task.  In part, the groups were not well-suited to
the enterprise of collectively pressuring Congress for broad public-regarding
changes.  Offered compromises that seemed to shield their own separate
interests, key members of the opposition to the legislation that became the 1998
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA] took their exemptions and ran.
Others, perhaps more mindful of unorganized end-user concerns, gave up
because the reworked bill was the best they could expect. 
To her credit, Professor Litman does not shy away from acknowledging
the resulting irony.  Despite all the antagonism the first version of digital
copyright legislation (and its proponents) attracted, particularly from the most
self-proclaimed public-spirited members of the opposition, the version finally
enacted turned out to be far more copyright-owner protectionist, far more
verbose, and far less susceptible of creative judicial readjustment than the first
bill.
This story invites more than one moral.  One is a lesson Professor
Litman has pressed throughout her academic career, beginning with her
comprehensive and masterful investigations of the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act.2  A statute structured to articulate broad protective principles,
Oregon L. Rev. 275 (1989).
3See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72
Cornell L. Rev. at 875-877 (describing negotiations for the 1976 Act regarding fair use
provisions as “tortuous” and stating that authors, publishers and educators “disagreed
violently about the scope of fair use”).
4See DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, p.125 & n.6.
5See, e.g., DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 125 (“noting that press response to initial DMCA
proposals accused copyright-holders of “grabbiness”); Pamela Samuelson, “The Copyright
Grab, Wired, Jan. 4, 1996 at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html
(on file with Columbia Journal for Law and the Arts) (“Now a group of major motion picture
producers, ound recording companies and print publishers have figured out a way to turn the
threat of digital technology into an opportunity.  Under this plan, they would retain all their
rights under existing law and quietly attain a host of new ones”); James Boyle,
“Overregulating the Internet,” Washington Times, November 14, 1995, at A17 (commenting
4
tempered by narrow exceptions tailored for parties present to bargain for them,
responds poorly to technological change because narrowly-crafted solutions
may become obsolete, and more importantly, technology may give rise to future
users whose interests could not have been represented when the deal was
struck.  This conclusion is unassailable.  But, standing alone, it is not enough,
for it does not tell us how else copyright legislation could be crafted, nor what
it should look like.  Happily, other chapters of the book do provide at least
some of the normative prescription these devastating descriptions compel.   I
shall turn to these later.
Another lesson may not be one Professor Litman herself would urge,
but it seems to me to emanate starkly from her story: if compromises do not
produce the best copyright legislation, neither do confrontations.  The pre-
DMCA way of making copyright laws, if ultimately underinclusive as to the
participant bargainers, was reasonably civil, perhaps because the included
groups had to live with each other.  This does not mean that disagreements
failed to abound.  On the contrary, for example, publisher-educator controversy
prickled throughout much of the 1976 Act drafting process.3  But agreements
were reached, thanks in large measure to the persistence and prestige of their
principal broker, then-Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer.  
During the four-year process that led to the DMCA, ad hominem  (ad
personam?) attacks seemed almost as plentiful as substantive objections.
Professor Litman refers to threats of grievous bodily harm leveled by the
Administration fficial leading the drive for legislation.4  (The threat, which she
delicately declines to detail, menaced permanent preclusion of the
unappreciated critic’s ability to procreate.)  The bills’ detractors were scarcely
less gentle, though their reproaches tended to tar their opponents with
corruption and greed, rather than to promise physical impairment.5  My point
that the White Paper suggestions would “foreclose[  ] a lot of the Net’s innovative and
exciting potential for the sake of a corporate welfare program”).
6DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 78. 
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is that these kinds of exchanges do not foster an atmosphere in which public-
serving compromise can be achieved, perhaps especially not for newcomers to
the lawmaking bargaining table.
Metaphors: From Compact to Property?
In “Choosing Metaphors,” Professor Litman contends that the rhetoric
of copyright has moved away from an initial – and implicitly correct –  public
bargain paradigm, in which the public gave up some user rights in order to
supply “a means to advance the public interest” by furnishing authors sufficient
compensation to encourage them to create.6  Copyright seals a compact
between authors and the public, with each giving something to the other for the
greater good.  Another version of this paradigm substitutes “balance” for
“bargain,” but the import is the same: the copyright balance between copyright
owners and copyright users justifies only so much copyright protection as will
promote creativity.  Accordingly, a level of protection that enhances rewards
to authors but frustrates secondary creativity or public dissemination tilts the
scales too heavily toward copyright owners, to the detriment of the public.
According to Professor Litman, the bargain paradigm left too large an
unprotected zone for the liking of copyright owners.  They therefore sought
new paradigms that would produce better coverage.  During the 1970s and
1980s, the emerging discipline of law and economics supplied the copyright
owner-favorable slant toward incentive analysis.  Incentive analysis, as viewed
by Professor Litman, fundamentally changes the raison d’être for copyright,
because
The economic analysis model focuses on the effect greater or
lesser copyright rights might have on incentives to create and exploit
new works.  It doesn’t bother about stuff like balance or bargains
except as they might affect the incentive structure for creating and
exploiting new works.  To justify copyright limitations, like fair use,
under this model, you need to argue that authors and publishers need
them in order to create new works of authorship, rather than, say,
because that’s partof the public’s share of the copyright bargain.  The
model is not rooted in compensation, and so it doesn’t ask how broad
a copyright would be appropriate or fair; instead it inquires whether
7DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 80.
8Id. at 81.
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broader, longer, or stronger copyright protection would be likely to
lead to the production of more works of authorship.7
Finally, in this story, we moved from bad to worse, from an analysis that
prized production over fairness, to one that elevates control over both
compensation and any semblance of balance.
The upshot of the change in the way we think about copyright
is that the dominant metaphor is no longer that of a bargain between
authors and the public.  We talk now of copyright as property that the
owner is entitled to control – to sell t  the public (or refuse to sell) on
whatever terms the owner chooses.  Copyright has been transformed
into a right of a property owner to protect what is rightfully hers.  (That
allows us to skip right past the question of what it is, exactly, that ought
to be rightfully hers.)8
A practical consequence of this rhetorical shift is to change the default
position of protection relative to exceptions (or, not to prejudice the inquiry,
non protection).  That is, back in the days of the “copyright bargain,” non
protection supplied the default; authors who complied with formalities enjoyed
limited rights designed to compensate, but no more.  During the dominance of
incentive rhetoric, the zone of protection grew, because more protection
promotes more creativity, but the zone of non protection – perhaps now better
characterized as exceptions – remained vibrant, if only because over-protection
ultimately frustrates the purpose of protection in the first place, which is to
enlarge the store of publicly available works of authorship.  (All authors must
to some extent build on their predecessors’ work, but we will not have second
authors if first authors’ control over their work is absolute.)  But when the
metaphor moves to a property paradigm, justifications for protection are no
longer needed, and justifications for exceptions seem less persuasive.
The progression Professor Litman describes is probably correct to the
extent hat today the control function of copyright may be more stressed than
its role in ensuring compensation.  Similarly, the emphasis on control may
obscure the importance of exceptions.  But it is misleading to suggest that these
two functions are opposed.  Copyright has always been about both
compensation and control.  And property rights rhetoric has p rsisted in U.S.
copyright from the start.  Similarly, the incentive rationale has also long been
an integral feature of Anglo-American copyright thinking.
98 Anne c. 19, 1710.
10U.S. Const., art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
11Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in
T.B. MACAULAY , PROSE AND POETRY 733-34 (G.M. Young ed 1952).
12The Federalist No. 43 at 279 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1941) (James Madison).
13See, e.g.,William Blackstone, Commentaries 213 (George B. Chase, ed., New
York, Banks and Brothers 1878) (observing that “it is agreed upon all hands, that occupancy
gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the earth itself:
which excludes everybody else but the owner from the use of it”).  
14Act of May 31,1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
15See id., sec. 3; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
16Act of Aug 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat 138 (repealed 1870); Act March 3, 1891, ch.
565,  26 Stat. 1106 (repealed 1909).  
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The 1710 statute of Anne, the first copyright statute, wore its incentive
policy on its title: “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors of Purchasers of such Copies . . .”9
Similarly, the U.S. Constitution proclaimed Congress’ “Power . . . to promote
the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . .”10 The Constitutional text in fact
combines incentive, public benefit, and property right rationales: Copyright
enabled the public to have “a supply of good books”11 and other works that
promote the progress of learning, by assuring authors “the exclusive Right to
their . . . Writings.”   Madison, in the FEDERALIST PAPERS, supported Congress’
power to legislate in the copyright field by emphasizing both the public benefit
to be derived from authors’ private rights, and that the author’s exclusive right
had already been recognized in England as “a right of common law.”12   In
eighteenth-century terms, “exclusive Right” meant “property,” for property
meant the right to exclude.13  Similarly, the constitutional text’s employment of
the word “securing” demonstrates that the property right was not one Congress
was to create, but rather to reaffirm and to strengthen.
One might reply that early copyright legislation is inconsistent with a
property right concept, because Congress recognized only the rights to “print,
publish and vend,” and only with respect to certain subject matter: maps, charts,
books.14  More importantly, Congress imposed a prerequisite of compliance
with formalities: federal copyright covered published works, but publication
without compliance forfeited the copyright.15  Congress recognized rights of
public performance and of dramatization and translation relatively late,16 hence
17See, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435-37 (1912); Crowe v. Aiken, Fed.
Cas. No. 3,441 (N.D.  Ill.  1870); Tomkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882); 2 Story, Equity
Jur. § 950 (1836).
18See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Estate of
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211  (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied,
207 F.3d 666 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2000).
19See, e.g., 2 Stat. 171 (1802) (prints); 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (musical compositions);
11 Stat. 138 (1856) (dramatic compositions); 13 Stat. 540 (1865) (photographs); 16 Stat. 212,
Rev. Stat. § 4948-71 (1870) (paintings, drawings, sculpture, and models or designs for works
of the fine arts).
20See  Act of Aug 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat 138 (repealed 1870) (granting right to
dramatic compositions and the right to public performance thereof).
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the federal copyright law did not assure to authors control over the full
economic value to be derived from their published works.
But it is important to recall that federal copyright law concerned only
published works.  As long as the work remained unpublished, the author’s
exclusive right was exclusive indeed, because the common law continued to
govern.  At first blush, it might appear that exclusive rights in unpublished
works would be of little economic value.  In fact, common law copyright
protected not only the right to publish a work, meaning to make the first
distribution to the public in copies, but also the right to public performance of
unpublished works.17  In other words, publication, the all-important dividing
line between common law copyright and its regime of exclusive control on the
one hand, and federal copyright’s limited protection on the other, did not mean
the same thing as public disclosure or public exploitation of a work. So long
as the work was not distributed to the general public in copies, the author or
right holder was deemed to have retained common law copyright over the
work,18 and to be entitled o enforce against unauthorized copying or publicly
performing.  Thus, a vast public might have seen an unpublished work
performed, still, it remained unpublished, and therefore not subject to the
limitations of federal copyright.
As a practical matter, this meant that copyright owners of works whose
economic value derived from their performance, rather than their publication
in copies, enjoyed a significant measure of legal control over their works.  For
works whose economic value also or primarily lay in distribution of copies,
however, federal protection was quite slim, until supplemented by performing
rights and derivative works rights.  With the inclusion of those rights, as well
as with the expansion of federal subject matter,19 copyright owners who
complied with formalities could assert exclusive claims to perform publicly for
profit,20 to reproduce and distribute their works, or to make adaptations of their
works.  Copyright owners could, moreover, control access to a work, whether
21See, e.g., EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (1879) (arguing
that ownership of property is created through production and observing "[this principle]
cannot be applied to the produce of one kind of labor, and withheld from that of another.  It
matters not whether the labor be of the body or of the mind"); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 11 (1847) ("This right [to profit from the reproduction
of copies] is to be derived, if at all, from the original, exclusive invention and possession by
the author of the ideas themselves, and of the combination of characters which exhibits those
ideas.)" 
See also the “pre constitutional” copyright statutes that many of the 13 former
Colonies enacted during the period of the Articles of Confederation, discussed in Francine
Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 Bull. Copyr. Soc. 11 (1975).
22See, e.g., DRONE, supra note 21, at 13 ("To say that authors have rights of
property in their literary productions, and that they are lost by publication, which is their only
source of value, is absurd.  It is destructive of the first principles, the essence, the very notion,
of the right of property").
23See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev.
1, 5-6 (1987). 
24See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) (subsistence of copyright); 201(a) (vesting of
copyright in authors); 201(c) retention of copyright by authors of contributions to collective
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published or unpublished, that was made publicly available primarily through
performances, and later, transmissions.  Until the advent of mass market audio
and video recording equipment, the public could not acquire access to a work
without purchasing a copy, or borrowing one from a library or a friend, or
viewing/listening to it through media licensed by the copyright owners.
In practice, then, copyright owners could exercise considerable control,
even back in the“bargain” days.  What about in the preaching?  Nineteenth-
century treatise writers stressed authors’ natural rights in their creations, rights
that arose from the creation of the work, not from any bargain with the public.21
Admittedly, these were authors’ rights at common law, rights they traded in for
the more limited protections of federal copyright (or forfeited) upon
publication.  But natural rights rhetoric pervaded even some discussions of
statutory copyright.22  Moreover, the 1976 Copyright Act  increasingly aligned
federal copyright with natural property rights conceptions of common law
copyright,23 by vesting federal copyright upon creation, rather than upon
publication together with compliance with formalities.  This was a crucial shift:
by making rights flow from the act of creation of the work rather than from
public distribution of notice-bearing copies, the 1976 Act vaunts authorship
over dissemination.  
The 1976 Act contained other author-favorable provisions, which in
their overall emphasis on creation and creators moved U.S. copyright toward
the continental European author-centric approach to copyright.24   U.S.
works; 201(d) (divisibility of copyright); 203(b) (termination of transfers); 204(a) (transfer
of exclusive rights requires signed writing); 304(c) (termination of transfers under extended
renewal right).  But see §§ 101, 201(b) (creator of a “work for hire” is not the statutory
“author”; nonetheless, categories of commissioned works for hire are limited, and require
writing signed by creator and hiring party).  The Supreme Court has discerned an overall
author-favorable cast to the 1976 Act.  See, e.g., New York Times C . v. Tasini, 121 S.Ct.
2381, 2389 (2001) ("The intent to enhance the author's position vis-a-vis the patron is also
evident in the 1976 Act's work-for-hire provisions").  See also Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts
on the Copyright Act of 1976,  22 N.Y.L. Sch  L. Rev. 477, 490 (1977) ("taken as a whole,
these changes [made by the 1976 Copyright Act]  mark a break with a two-hundred-year-old
tradition that has identified copyright more closely with the publisher than with the author").
  
On similarities and differences between U.S. copyright and continental copyright (or
“author’s right”) systems, see generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 8-10 (2001); ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET
COPYRIGHT: DIVERGENCES ET CONVERGENCES (1993).
25Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised July
24, 1971, preamble, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31.
26See, e.g., id. arts. 9.2, 10, 10bis, 11bis.3, 13.1
27Compare WIPO Copyright Treaty, CRNR/DC/94, Preamble ¶ 5: “Recognizing the
need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest,
particularly education, research, and access to information, as reflected in the Berne
Convention.”  See also, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C
[TRIPS accord], art. 7, para. 1, Objectives, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994): “The protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge, and in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”
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adherence to the Berne Convention in 1989 further enhanced this
rapprochement.  Significantly, the Berne Convention announces a goal “to
protect in as uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary
and artistic works”25; although the Convention provides for a variety of
exceptions to copyright,26 it does not advertise itself as effecting a “bargain” or
a “balance” of author and user interests,27 nor, for that matter, does it appeal to
incentive analysis to justify copyright.
This compressed review suggests that the metaphors undergirding
copyright in the U.S. have long been more mixed than DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
appears to suggest.  Moreover, those partial to a more natural rights property-
oriented concept of copyright are not only large, unsavory “content industries;”
they also include advocates of the continental doctrine of authors’ “moral
rights” to protect the integrity of their work and to receive recognition for it
28See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, “The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for
the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors,” 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 47 (1988) (citing common
law copyright as “recognition of the personal aspect of artistic creativity” and observing that
“this protection was based on the natural property right than an author had by virtue of
having created the work”); Neil Netanel, “Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of
Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law,” 12 Cardozo Arts & Ent.
L.J. 1, 16  (observing the rise in Continental legal history of a moral rights regime co-existing
within a natural law concept of copyright and attributing this in part to a feeling that “the
property analogy did not adequately express the growing emphasis on individual personality
and the personal connection between authors and their creations”).   .  
29See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (“Due to the ease with which digital
works can be copied...copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on
the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy”).
30DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 78.
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(albeit for different reasons).28  Different justifications may be pressed into
service to favor different goals, including to enhance copyright owner control,
but conceiving of copyright as entitling the creator to control her work’s
disposition is not only the overreaching vision of user-unfriendly producers, it
is also the expectation of authors who perceive their rights as flowing from the
creative act.
That said, my criticism in this instance is ultimately one of degree rather
than of kind: although all of these justifications have been advanced throughout
our copyright history, different justifications receive greater emphasis at
different imes, and I will acknowledge that at the current time, the property
right justification conveniently serves those who seek to strengthen copyright
coverage, even (or especially?) at the expense of traditional limitations.
Nonetheless, it is entirely possible to advance the other justifications to achieve
the same goal.  Indeed, copyright owners, in urging Congress to pass the
DMCA’s prohibitions on circumventing access controls, contended that without
this reinforced protection, they would lack incentive to make their works
available over the Internet.29  Even social compact rhetoric might work.  After
all, the social compact formulation can be seen as a variant of the incentive
argument: Professor Litman characterizes “bargain” copyright  as “a way to
permit authors to make enough money from the works they created in order to
encourage them to create the works and make them available to the public.”30
And while “enough money” would not have meant untold riches, the quantum
of “enough” encouragement may be risingsteadily, not only because creators
and/or producers may have become greedy, but also because the cost of
31Schurz Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 982 F.2d
1043, 1046  (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that “[m]ost television entertainment programs are losers”
and that “losses are offset by the occasional hit that makes it into syndication after completing
a long first run”); Donal E. Biederman, et al., Law and Business of the Entertainment
Industries, at 585 (Praeger Publishers 2001) (observing that in the music business, “[a]s in
other segments of the entertainment industry, the record company relies on one hit album...to
pay for a raft of unsuccessful albums”);  Judy Stoffman, “Rebel Takes on Big Booksellers,”
The Toronto Star, November 14, 2000 (explaining that “risky books in the form of poetry or
cultural studies could be cross-subsidized by the profits from more commercial titles”); Kay
McFadden, “Bad TV!  Bad TV!  Not Even Cute Dogs Get the Ratings Anymore,” Seattle
Times, November 30, 1998 (describing how cross-subsidization by a parent company allows
Fox Television to purchase television airing rights for theatrical films).
32For example, I find it difficult to credit any of Napster’s defenses, see Jane
Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum.-VLA J. L. & the Arts 1, 29-
42 (2000).  I note, however, that in a subsequent chapter, Professor Litman indicates that
Napster’s activities might not be shielded by her ideal copyright law, either.  See DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT at 181.
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producing and publicizing works is ever-higher, particularly if successful works
cross-subsidize more risky ventures.31
Ultimately, actions speak louder than words, so it may be instructive at
this point tourn from metaphors to “The Copyright Wars” to consider what
Professor Litman perceives copyright owners to have been doing with their
rights, whatever the justifications invoked for them.
“The Copyright Wars”: Copyright Owners v. New Technology?
The story Professor Litman recounts in this Chapter (and the next,
“Copyright Law in the Digital Milenium”) is a sorry one indeed.   It is a tale of
misplaced fears and  missed opportunities, one the cause, the other the result
of copyright owner overreaching.  According to this account, from portable
MP3 players through Napster and beyond, copyright owners consistently
endeavored to suppress innovative and desirable ways of using the Internet to
enhance the public’s enjoyment of copyrighted works.  At the same time,
copyright owners declined to devise owner-safe but user-friendly ways to
exploit he emerging online market.  While I disagree with Professor Litman’s
suggestion that most of the innovators’ activities were in good faith and non
infringing,32 her fundamental point is well-taken.  The moral here is not quite
“if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em,” but rather, “stop trying to beat ‘em; we’ll all
be better off if you joined ‘em,” or even “if you copyright owners won’t join
’em, you copyright owners should be beaten.”
33See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ; RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp.2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (preliminary
injunction ordered January 29, 2000 against websites posting “De-CSS” software to
neutralize DVD access-controls), No. 00-0277, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11696 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
17, 2000) (permanent injunction awarded). 
34Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v.  Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F. 3d 1072
(9th Cir. 1999) ( construing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.).
35I develop this thesis more fully in Copyright and Control over New Technologies
of Dissemination, forthcoming, 101 Colum.  L. Rev.(Nov. 2001).  I also note that several of
Prof. Litman’s articles, some of which were adapted into chapters of DIGITAL COPYRIGHT,
largely inspired (or provoked) me to write Copyright and Control.
36See, e.g., DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 158 (My.MP3.com established a database of
recordings to stream back to customers who already possessed the recordings; the customers
were entitled to make their own copies of their recordings); 159 (Napster relied on
subscribers’ entitlement to make personal noncommercial copies of recordings); 162
13
In fact, however, in many of the cases that these copyright/technology
clashes generated, copyright owners prevailed.33  The leading exception
concerns the “Diamond Rio” portable MP3 player, which the Ninth Circuit held
was not a “digital audio recording device” under the terms of the 1992 Audio
Home Recording Act, and therefore was not subject to an injunction or
payment of a levy fee.34    I believe the principal difference between “Rio” on
the one hand and Napster and other suits in which the copyright owners
prevailed on the other was the courts’ perception that, in the case of the “Rio,”
copyright owners were attempting to eliminate a new technology without
offering their own equivalent alternative, while in the other cases copyright
owners were in fact licensing (or endeavoring to license) the uses with which
the defendants were competing.  In essence, when copyright owners attempt to
beat down a new mode of enjoyment of copyrighted works, they lose, but when
they seek to exploit the new market that new technology has opened, courts
enforce the copyright law to preserve the copyright owners’ exclusive rights
against innovative “upstarts.”35
In other words, the outcomes in many of the Internet copyright cases
meet the morals suggested above.  Prof. Litman and I might nonetheless
disagree over whether copyright owners really were trying to develop new
modes of bringing their works to the public, or simply were trying to shore up
old business plans while fending off outside innovators.  We might also disagree
over whether the copyright law in fact entitles copyright owners to block some
of the new business schemes the Internet fostered.  For example, Professor
Litman points out that in several instances, the Internet entrepreneurs were
essentially helping consumers do what the law entitled them to do themselves.36
(RecordTV relied on customer’s entitlement to time shift television programming).
37See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381
(6th Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (educational institutions and professors may enjoy a fair use privilege to photocopy
from protected works for purposes of teaching, but both courts held that it is not fair use for
an off-campus, for profit, photocopy shop to prepare course cks at the professors’ behest,
without the copyright owner’s authorization).  
38DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 163.
39See, e.g., id. at 27-32, 80-86, 95-96, 115, 131-33, 140-45, 167.
40See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).  The U.S. rule is often called the “first sale doctrine”; the
term “exhaustion” is more frequently used in Europe.
41See id. § 109(b) (limiting the first sale doctrine to accord a rental right to copyright
owners of sound recordings and computer programs).  Congress breached the chattel owner’s
first sale immunity because it was convinced of a high correspondence between rental and
uncompensated private copying.  See S. Rep. No. 98-162, at 2 (1983) ("The Committee has
no doubt that the purpose and result of record rentals is to enable and encourage customers
to tape their rented albums at home.").  See also TRIPs rt. 11 (requiring member states to
extend rights to prohibit rentals of computer software and cinematographic works, but
exempting the latter from “unless such rental has led to widespread copying of such works
which is materially impairing the exclusive right of reproduction . . .”).
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But there are two problems with this line of argument.  First, it may be fair use
for users to engage in certain kinds of noncommercial personal copying; it does
not necessarily follow that it is fair use for a commercial third party to go into
the business of facilitating end-users’ copyright exempt activities, if that
business entails making copies of the work.37  
Second, to the extent that the argument relies on what uses were
exempt in the analog world to justify “an online analogue to an offline
resource,”38 it may be fallacious.  Professor Litman decries throughout DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT the endeavors of copyright owners to reduce or eliminate free use
zones.39  But the mere existence of a free use in the analog world should not
suffice to warrant its transposition to the digital world.  One should inquire why
the use was exempt.  (I acknowledge that this inquiry proceeds from a default
assumption that most uses that entail copying or public performance fall within
copyright control; under the opposite default, that may have characterized
“bargain” copyright, what required justification was not the exemption but the
coverage.)  In some cases, the user was exercising dominion over a physical
object.  Copyright owners’ control over an individual copy was “exhausted”
with its sale.40  Users therefore enjoyed chattel rights in exhaustion copies, at
least up to the point at which the exploitation of those copies competed with
copyright owner exercise of the reproduction and distribution rights.41  In the
digital context, there is no physical original; every communication of the “copy”
42See, e.g., Copyright Office “Section 104 Report” available at
<http://www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf> at 99-101
(discussing economic impact of proposed “digital first sale doctrine”).
I take the occasion of this reference to the Copyright Office to take issue with the
characterization f the Copyright Office as “moving firmly in the content industry’s pocket”
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 74.  This is unfair and inaccurate; the Office has, I believe,
endeavored to maintain a principled course, often under tryi g circumstances, between the
interests of creators, producers, educators, exploiters, and other members of the wider public.
See, e.g.,Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service: Final Rule, 65
Fed. Reg. 77292 (Dec. 11. 2000) (ruling that FCC licensed broadcasters who simultaneously
webcast were subject to same compulsory license obligations as other webcasters); Exemption
to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies: Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555 (Oct. 27, 2000) (identification of “classes of
works” to exempt from § 1201(a)(1) prohibition on circumvention of access controls,
pursuant to §1201(a)(1)(C&D)); Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education (M y
1999), available at <http://www.loc.gov/copyright/docs/de_rprt.pdf>   
43See, e.g., Robert Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
“Newtonian” World of On-line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 115 (1997).
44See e.g., DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 112-17,
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entails making more copies, and in any event, the risk of competition with the
exercise of core exclusive rights of copyright may be substantially increased.42
Similarly, digital media and monitoring may substantially undermine the bases
of a free zone grounded in the excessive transaction costs of enforcement.43
These criticisms may be doctrinally sound (at least under my view of
copyright doctrine), but they may not promote good results in the broader
scheme.  A copyright specialist may understand why the user is not entitled to
equally autonomous enjoyment of digital as opposed to hard copies; the user
may neither grasp nor believe these distinctions, as Professor Litman stresses
in Chapter 8 (“Just Say Yes to Licensing!”).44  The copyright system cannot
infinitely absorb cognitive dissonance, at least not if users can themselves
exercise the no longer so “exclusive rights” of reproduction, adaptation, public
distribution, public performance and public display, and on a very grand scale.
This is not necessarily a recipe for anarchy, but it does suggest a pressing need
for a copyright law that users will respect, either because they will have no
choice, as most users will be technologically and legally disabled from impeding
the exclusivity of copyright, or because users will agree with the law’s goals
and will therefore adhere to its prescriptions.  The DMCA largely takes the
former approach; Professor Litman counsels the latter. 
A Copyright Law We All Can Learn to Love?
This brings me to Professor Litman’s prescriptions, set out in Chapter
12, “Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age.”  She makes two
45Id. at 174.
46Id. at 172-73.
47See Copyright and Control, supra note xx.
48See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Songwriters and Publishers Reach a Deal with Napster,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at C10 (explaining that the the National Music Publishers
Association  remained in negotiation with the five major record companies regarding plans
to start an online subscription service, but hoped the Napster settlement would “become a
template in its negotiations”).
49DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 180.
50Id at 175, 180.
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recommendations.  First, and in admittedly utopian fashion, she suggests “a
temporary period during which the Internet could be a copyright-free zone.”45
Professor Litman’s review of copyright history persuades her that new
technologies that exploit copyrighted works do not get developed or
disseminated unless copyright owners are cleared away from obstructing the
path of progress.46  While I do not agree that the history warrants tarring
copyright owners as such troglodytes,47 I acknowledge that some spectacular
infringements may in fact initiate new markets more rapidly and more broadly
than they would be were they left solely to copyright owner development.  I
would put Napster in that category, for example: Napster was unambiguously
a contributory infringer, but, by enabling its millions of subscribers to exploit the
capacity of digital media to disaggregate, duplicate, and communicate individual
recorded songs, Napster undoubtedly hastened the advent of licensed
personalized downloads of popular musical offerings.48
Professor Litman recognizes that her first prescription is unlikely to be
followed.  She devotes more detail to the second, that copyright be 
recast[] . . . as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation.  Making
money (or trying to) from someone else’s work without permission
would be infringement, as would large-scale interference with copyright
holders’ opportunities to do so.49
This recommendation requires significant, and probably salutary,
reconceptualization of copyright law.  As Professor Litman points out, our
copyright law has generally made the copy the “compensable unit” that
triggered the author’s right to be paid or to prevent.50  But linking exclusive
rights to copies becomes problematic in a digital world in which every use of
the work, including by individuals for private non commercial purposes, entails
51European copyright scholars have also expounded on this problem, see, e.g, Jaap
Spoor, The Copyright Approach to Copying on the Internet: (Over)Stretching the
Reproduction Right?, in P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, ED., THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 67 (1996).
52See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition); 106(4)(5)(6) (exclusive rights).
53See id. §§ 101 (definitions of “copies” and “fixed”); 106(1)(3) (exclusive rights).
Courts have recognized that making copies available for downloading effects a
“distribution”of copies, although in those cases the copies were for retention, not for transient
communication.  See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 453 (N.D.
Tex. 1997). See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503
(N.D. Ohio 1997); cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995)(volatile copies merely transited by service provider do not give rise to liability).
Whether copies residing in the recipient’s computer for too long to be considered merely
transient, but not capable of being retained also are copies that trigger the reproduction right
depends on the RAM copying doctrine, under which temporary digital copies are “copies”.
This doctrine has been strongly criticized, including by Prof. Litman, but I believe it is
implicit in the text of the U.S. Copyright Act (as well as in European Union law), and has
been applied by U.S. courts.  See generally, Copyright Office “§ 104 Report,” supra note xx,
at 106-29 (discussing text of U.S. Copyright Act, E.U. Directives, and U.S. caselaw).
54This is the approach advocated by the Copyright Office, see “§104 Report”, supra,
note xx, at 142-46.  The Report also suggests that it might be appropriate to introduce a
“symmetrical” exemption from the performance right when the digital communication is a
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making at least temporary copies.51  Actually, the situation is even more
complicated, because copies are not the only compensable event in our
copyright law, public performances and displays are too.  So long as
reproductions and public performances entailed different acts and different kinds
of exploitations, it made sense to recognize different kinds of exclusive rights,
and different owners of these rights.  With digital communications, however,
the same act can be considered a reproduction and distribution of copies on the
one hand, and a public performance or display of the work on the other.  For
example, an on demand audio- or videostream of a work falls squa ely within
the definition of a “public performance or display,”52 but, because temporary
copies are being made as part of the communication, the rights to reproduce
and distribute the work in copies are also triggered, even if the stream does not
allow for making a retention copy.53  If different entities own the reproduction
and public performance rights, the online entrepreneur may need to acquire
licenses from both, even though, from the user’s perspective, the
communication is experienced as a performance, rather than as the delivery of
a copy.  This “double dipping” would increase the cost of the online activity,
potentially making it less attractive to entrepreneurs and to users.  One way out
of the problem would be to characterize the act as being re llya public
performance, and only incidentally, automatically and imperceptibly a
reproduction and distribution of copies, and then to exempt the latter.54  
download.  The symmetrical exemption would be justified because separate administration
and double dipping remain a problem when the end user is seeking to acquire a copy rather
than a real time performance, as the delivery of the copy could be considered a public
performance as well as a digital distribution of a copy.  It therefore would follow that the
reproduction right is the only one that should be paid for.  Id. at 146-48.
For a general discussion of the “overlapping copyrights” problem, see Mark Lemley,
Dealing With Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 547 (1997).
55DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 180.
56Id at 181.
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As long as we can tell when the economically significant act is a
reproduction as opposed to a public performance (or vice versa), this kind of
analysis and result make perfect sense.  But will we always be able to tell when
the act is mostly or more like one or the other?  Imagine, for example, an online
subscription service that will enable customers to program their music-listening
day.  From 12:00 to 12:03, the subscriber will hear “I Wanna Hold Your
Hand;” from 12:03 to 12:07, “Don’t You Want Somebody to Love?;” from
12:07 to 1:00, a further selection of nostalgia, and so on.  The subscriber is not
receiving these songs in real time, however; the service has sent her hard drive
the contents at the lower-traffic time of 4:00 AM, but timed them to “play” at
the hours selected.  Is this a reproduction and distribution or a public
performance?  Does it matter if, obsessed with Jefferson Airplane, the
subscriber has programmed “White Rabbit” to play twice an hour all week, so
that the copy the service sends stays in the subscriber’s hard drive continuously
for a week?  A month?  But the subscriber hears it only at the pre-programmed
times.  Is this arrangement’s economic significance as a public performance?
Or as a (temporary) copy?  As both, because the subscriber enjoys the “public
performance” experience of hearing the work on demand, but the “copy”
convenience of having it temporarily on her hard drive?
Given the confluence of potentially conflicting exclusive rights,
Professor Litman’s proposal to discard our current categories of rights and
adopt an exclusive right of commercial exploitation has considerable appeal.
Her articulation of the right’s scope also seems reasonable, as the “large scale
interference” refinement  would cover, for example, “routine free use of
educational materials by educational institutions,”55 and even Napster, given the
scale of its facilitation of individual copying.56  I suppose adaptations should
also come within the scope of the commercial exploitation right, at least if
“making a profit from someone else’s work” includes making a profit from a
work based on someone else’s work.   If derivative works would be covered,
then an unauthorized adaptation without a commercial purpose would also run
afoul of the standard if it significantly compromises the copyright owner’s
market for new versions of its work.  That standard may lead to considerable
57See, e.g., Berne Convention, art. 6bis.
58DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, at 184.
59Id at 185.
60 See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.
J. 1023, 1029-30 and n. 19 (1976), citing Judgment of 20 May 1911 (Millet) Trib. Civ. Seine,
1911 Amm. I. 271. See also  Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 at 25, n. 13 (2d Cir. 1976)
(disclosure at the beginning of a television program that it has been cut without permission
does nothing to alert those who tune in late).
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uncertainty, though perhaps not notably more than under the fair use defense
that a non commercial user would today invoke.  But it would have been
desirable to have had further exploration of how far the “from someone else’s
work” concept reaches.
Professor Litman does address, and offers an innovative solution to, a
related problem, alterations to works that violate their integrity.  The integrity
right may overlap with the adaptation right, but it secures interests that are not
purely economic.  In its original continental guise, moreover, the beneficiary of
the right is the work’s creator, regardless of whether the creator remains the
copyright owner.57  In a digital environment, non creator copyright owners may
also seek to ensure the authenticity of the documents they purvey.  Professor
Litman recognizes both that digital media permit works to be “altered,
undetectably, and there is no way for an author to insure that the work being
distributed over her name is the version she wrote,” and that the proposed  right
of commercial exploitation will not redress non commercial distortions of
authors’ work.58  Nonetheless, she does not conclude that the increased risk of
alteration justifies enhanced control over digital documents; Professor Litman
fears that the sympathetic goal of protecting integrity rights will prove to be the
tail that wags the unattractive dog objective of limiting public access to works
of authorship.  The recommendation that would reconcile authenticity with
access: “any adaptation, lice sed or not, should be accompanied by a truthful
disclaimer and a citation (or hypertext link) to an unaltered and readily
accessible copy of the original.”59
Will this work?  Interestingly, the comparison shopping approach has
been advanced before – in early 20th-century France, by the publisher of mass
market reproductions of Millet’s painting L’A elus.  The reproductions altered
the light, and added haberdashery to the female figures; the publisher of the
distorted images contended – unsuccessfully – that the public could compare
the published version against the original in the Louvre.60  The transaction costs
of consulting the original would discourage any meaningful comparison.  But
in the digital context, a hyperlink would remove that friction.  Digital media
might even enhance the comparison, by instantly identifying disparities between
61DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, at 183.
62Id.
63Id. at 184.
64Id.
65See, e.g., id. at 83, 167, 170, 176 (observing throughout that persistent access
controls ubject the public’s access to unprotected elements such as facts and ideas to the
whim and unfettered discretion of copyright holders in a manner unprecedented in American
legal history).
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the two versions.  Of course, this is not a true integrity right, it is a full
disclosure obligation.  An author could not prohibit the dissemination of even
a grossly distorted version so long as proper disclosure were made.
Professor Litman would also legislate affirmative user rights.  These
would include “a right to read,” which means “a right to engage in copying or
other uses incidental to a licensed or legally privileged use.”61  The public would
also enjoy a right to hyperlink, on the ground that this is simply “referring to an
infringing work,” an activity that has never itself been infringement.62  Fi ally,
Professor Litman would reinforce the idea/expression dichotomy and the public
domain by according “a limited privilege to circumvent any technological access
controls” for the purpose of “gain[ing] access to, extract, use, and reuse the
ideas, facts, information and other public domain material embodied in
protected works.”63  She would also accord a privilege “to reproduce, adapt,
transmit, perform or display as much of the protected expression as is required
in order to gain access to the unprotected elements.”64
What would these proposals mean in practice?  Despite DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT’s hostility to access controls,65 the first user right is not inconsistent
with an access-controlled pay-per-use scheme.  The “licensed use” would be,
for example, the single viewing of the video-streamed motion picture.  RAM
copies incidental to that viewing would be permitted (indeed, should be
considered to be impliedly licensed), but the proposed user right would not here
permit unlicensed retention copies.  Would the same analysis apply to an access-
controlled free-standing copy, such as a limited-viewing DVD that allows only
3 full plays?  The “licensed use” here stops after the third viewing; further
copies not incidental to those viewings should not be permitted.  But this is
beginning to sound like a slippery slope.  Before concluding that the “licensed
use” concept ends up giving copyright owners everything their greedy hearts
desire, it is important to recall the “legally privileged use” standard that
supplements i .  Not all private acts are “legally privileged,” however.  There
should not be a “legal privilege” to buy three plays and get an additional
unlimited number free.  On the contrary, the extra viewings should be deemed
infringements.  Under the § 106 rights that Professor Litman would replace, the
66See, e.g., Harper & Row Inc. v. Nation Ents., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).(“The crux
of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.”); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,239 F.3d 1004, 1015
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F.Supp. 679. 687 (N.D.Cal. 1994))
(use is commercial when users download video games “to avoid having to buy video game
cartridges”).
6717 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2).
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private viewing of the film engages no exclusive rights, but the RAM copies
that enable the viewing do.  Under the “exclusive right of commercial
exploitation,” one could argue that getting something for nothing when the
something was offered for sale is a kind of commercial exploitation.66  One
could also contend that deeming the extra copies privileged would constitute
“large scale  interference with the copyright holder’s opportunities” to profit
from the work.
But what about restrictions not grounded in copyright-implicating acts?
The most notorious example is region coding, that is, DVDs whose licensed
viewing is limited by geography (actually, by compatibility with playback
machines whose distribution is geographically segmented)?  Is there a “legal
privilege” to access a work that is fixed in a copy for which you paid?  One
might respond that the user paid to view the work in some places, but not in
others, and that this is no different from the user w o paid to view the work a
certain umber of times: If one can prohibit the user from viewing the work at
all, surely one can impose the lesser prohibition of limiting where she can view
it. But, at least under the § 106 rights regime, this argument clashes with the
statute’s implementation of the first sale doctrine.  The statute not only
recognizes the chattel owner’s rights as to her copy in general, but also
specifically overrides the copyright owner’s importation rights with respect to
importation of a copy for private use.67  In other words, one may discern in the
1976 Act an affirmative user right (or “legal privilege”) not subject to
geographic onditioning.  Region coding is arguably an improper end-run
around this right.
Consider Professor Litman’s second proposed user right, to hyperlink,
even to sites hosting infringing works.  Here, the analogy to citations and other
ways of referring to infringing works strikes me as too facile.  RAM copying
aside, a hyperlink makes subsequent copying far easier than do other forms of
reference, given the relative friction of following up the analog citation.
Nonetheless, if hyperlinking violates copyright, it should only be derivatively,
as a contributory infringement, in which the linker’s intent to promote
infringement, and the non infringing uses of the hyperlink, for example, to
promote discussion of the alleged infringement, would be taken into account.
68See DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 144 (“If ‘access’ is understood to refer only to initial
access, the statute’s distinction between circumvention of access-protection technology, and
circumvention of copy-protection technology (almost) makes sense.”)
69Moreover, I believe current copyright law would permit these activities, see 17
U.S.C. § 1201(b); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the Digital Millennium, 23
Colum.-VLA J. L. & the Arts 137,152-53 (1999).
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Finally, there is the proposed user right to circumvent access controls
in order to give effect to the idea/expression dichotomy and to keep the public
domain public.  I am assuming it is appropriate to interpolate the precondition
that the user has obtained lawful initial access to the work, for example by an
authorized online viewing, or by acquiring lawful possession (by purchase or
loan, including free borrowing) of the copy in which the access-protected work
is fixed.68  But this interpolation begs the question whether it is appropriate to
circumvent subsequent access controls.  Let us return to the example of the 3-
play DVD, and let us assume that the motion picture incorporates public
domain historical film footage.  I find it problematic to suggest that the user
should be entitled to an unpaid fourth play on the ground that the user wants to
re-view the historical footage, or on the ground that the user wants to revie
the work in order to identify its plot ideas.  The proposition that users should
be permitted to circumvent access controls under these circumstances seems to
me share the fallacy earlier evoked of treating digital deliveries like exhaustion
copies.  The whole point of digital delivery, whether online, or in a limited-play
freestanding package like our hypothetical DVD, is to permit price
discrimination of a kind that consumers should find attractive.   If the revised
copyright law insists on treating these deliveries like exhaustion copies, there
will be no point in offering works at differently-priced levels of enjoyment.
But if the proposition were changed to advocate circumvention of anti-
copy controls on a lawfully-accessed work for the purpose of extracting non
protected facts and other public domain elements, then the proposition becomes
much more appealing, as least as to he act of circumventing for this purpose,
including offering services limited to this purpose.69  The problem, which
Professor Litman and other commentators have noted, is that most users will
be unable to effect this circumvention themselves; they will need services or
devices to do it, and the DMCA bars the dissemination of any device whose
purpose or use is not substantially confined to permitting non infringing uses.
If machines cannot tell the difference between circumventing to copy
information, and circumvention to copy protected works, then the DMCA
70See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millenium Copyright
Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 733 (2000)  (observing that the interplay between exceptions and
restrictions in Section 1201 “produces a most curious state of affairs” which “safeguards
various rights to users but simultaneously bars third parties from assisting them to take
advantage of those safeguarded rights”).
71DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 185.
72See Copyright Legislation for the Digital Millennium, supra note 69, at 140-55.
73I borrow the “copyright pessimist” and “copyright optimist” terminology from
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15-20 (1994).
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effectively bans all copy-control circumvention devices70 (albeit not services,
except to the extent that the services rely on the devices).
One way out of this impasse would borrow from Professor Litman’s
approach to integrity rights: copyright owners who distribute works in access-
or copy-protected form should also make them available in non protected
formats, and should provide “a citation (or hypertext link) to [information about
how and where to consult a] . . . readily accessible [unprotected] copy of the
[work].”71
Ultimately, the circumvention problem comes down to identifying tails
and dogs.  For Professor Litman, the DMCA permits copyright owners to
exercise unwarranted and unprecedented control over users’ activities, in the
name of securing protected works against infringement.  Thus the copyright
owner tail is wagging the public’s dog of lawful uses of protected and
unprotected works.  For me, unrestricted distribution of circumvention devices
would promote massive infringement in the name of facilitating fair use,  even
when lawful uses can be achieved by means other than circumvention.  While
I have elsewhere discussed aspects of the DMCA that I find quite troubling,72
I am nonetheless concerned that Professor Litman’s prescription could mean
that enhancing the convenience of lawful uses would be wagging the dogs not
only of effective protection of authors’ rights, but of new ways of offering the
works to the (paying) public.
Finally, it is necessary to ask the question whether the public would be
more copyright-compliant if the law made more sense.  Under the current
copyright law, I think Professor Litman could fairly be called a “copyright
pessimist” or copyright skeptic, while I would be deemed a “copyright
optimist.”73  Were some of Professor Litman’s proposals enacted, I think the
roles might be reversed.  That is because I fear that I am rather skeptical of the
optimism she expresses that the public, having a good intuitive sense of what
74DIGITAL COPYRIGHT at 180 (stating that the public generally believes copyright law
“incorporates a distinction between commercial and noncommercial behavior” and arguing
in favor of formalizing this belief by “recasting copyright as an exclusive right of commercial
exploitation”).
75Exodus 20:15.
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a fair and reasonable copyright law should be,74 would adhere to one.  I have
a fifteen year-old son; if anyone should be sensitive to the basic aspirations of
copyright (if not the content of its excruciating statutory minutia), he should be.
But he also has on his hard drive a large collection of unpaid-for songs
downloaded from Napster.  Does he know that this is “wrong”?  Of course.
(He even put on an angelic smile one day to inquire, “Mom, you wouldn’t want
me to be using Napster, would you?”  Then his 11 year-old sister denounced
him.)  But he also likes “free music,” or, more accurately, music that he can get
for free, even if its creators and performers had soughtto be paid.  The point:
In the post-Napster world, it may require an optimistic copyright advocate
indeed to trust that users’ consciences are quickened, or their acts forestalled,
by a copyright law even as simple and sensible as the direction in the
Decalogue: “Thou shalt not steal.”75
That does not mean a “copyright police”-state is required, either.
Somewhere in between the restrictive excesses of the DMCA and some of the
more forgiving fancies of DIGITAL COPYRIGHT lies the right path.  Professor
Litman’s book has the great merit of provoking serious thought about how that
path should be drawn, and of offering stimulating prescriptions to point the
way.
